This article examines recent manifestations and trends of Azerbaijani nationalism, highlighting their complexity as they have evolved within regional and international contexts as expressions of Azerbaijani identity. It argues that although the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the l990s was instrumental in invoking and strengthening Azerbaijani nationalism, more recent manifestations of nationalism have been varied and responsive to domestic as well as international influences. These influences include the de-russification of Azerbaijani names, which began toward the end of the Soviet era, and the development of national movements aimed at promoting the country"s image internationally. One means by which to achieve this latter goal has been record-setting, which has included the creation of the world"s largest national flag, prioritization of sporting excellence and attempts to host major international sporting and other events, and grandiose construction of buildings, pipelines, and communication and transportation networks. The Azerbaijani diaspora has also been active in promoting an Azerbaijani identity in opposition to Armenia. At the regional level, expressions of Azerbaijani nationalism have caused apprehension within Iran that Iranian Azerbaijanis might participate in these movements. Diplomatic efforts have been aimed at achieving balance, especially in Azerbaijani relations with Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, and the West. The article concludes that Azerbaijani nationalism is currently based on a weak economic foundation of extravagance enabled by oil and gas wealth. It recommends economic diversification, as well as a rethinking of Azerbaijani nationalism policy aimed toward fostering national identity in a less costly manner.
Introduction

Defining Nationalism
Azerbaijani nationalism is difficult to define or explain because of its complexity and its diverse domestic and international influences. Moreover, nationalism is itself a vague concept. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, nationalism entails feelings of loyalty and devotion toward a nation, and especially a sense of national consciousness. This leads to the exaltation of one nation above all others and the promotion of its culture and interests over those of other nations or supranational groups (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalism).
Naming Patterns in Azerbaijan
In this section, I consider Azerbaijani nationalism in relation to anti-Russian sentiments through an examination of changes in naming practices (first and last names) in Azerbaijan.
Russification of First Names
Following Azerbaijan"s incorporation into the Soviet regime, it became mandatory for Azerbaijanis to register their names and to add a Russian suffix such as "-yev" or "-ov" to male names and "-yeva" or "-ova" to female names.
However, the majority of people did not have official surnames. Soviet bureaucrats often resolved this problem simply by adopting the name of the individual"s father and adding traditional suffixes, such as "-yev" / "-yeva" or "-ov" / "-ova," meaning "born of." Some examples include the conversion of Ali to Aliyev (for a male) or Aliyeva (for a female), Husein to Huseinov or Huseinova, and Mammad (short for Mohammad) to Mammadov or Mammadova.
First names changed gradually during the Soviet period, influenced by the social situation and communist ideology. The general shift in naming practices that occurred during this period was primarily influenced by Russian naming practices and the communist way of life. For example, many names referred to occupations such as Traktor (tractor) and Kombayn (combine) . In addition, there were names associated with the Communist Party such as Narkom (from the Russian, Narodniy Komitet, which means people"s committee) and Raykom (from the Azerbaijani Rayon Komitesi, meaning regional committee). In addition, many names such as Malumat (information) were influenced by the communist regime.
During the 1920s and 1930s, new types of names became popular. Examples of male names included Azad ("freedom"), Bakhtiyar ("fortune"), Saadat ("happiness"), Ingilab ("revolution"), Mubariz ("struggle"), Mubarak and Tabrik (both meaning "best wishes"), and Vugar ("pride"), New names for females included Irada ("will" or "determination"), Matanat ("strength," "steadiness," or "tolerance"), Azade ("freedom"), and Rafiga ("friend" or "companion"), which suggested comradeship with men in building a new society. This naming pattern seems to have been intended as testimony of success or happiness associated with life in the Soviet Union.
Given the widespread use of Russian in Azerbaijan, naming patterns were also influenced by Russian customs. In 1938, when Cyrillic was imposed in Azerbaijan, Arabic had already been officially replaced by a modified Latin script, introduced in 1928. However, there was considerable confusion regarding this script. Political realities also influenced naming practices. Popular acceptance of Russian naming patterns is reflected in birth certificates issued during the Soviet period. For example, in Russian, most female names contain three syllables, with the last syllable ending with the vowel "-a." Examples include Ludmila, Svetlana, Natalya, Marina, Maria, and Tatyana. Whereas Russians stress the middle syllable in such names (e.g., lud-MI-la, svet-LA-na), in traditional Azerbaijani names, the stress is always on the last syllable of a name such as ley-LA (Leyla), sev-DA (Sevda), and re-NA (Rena). The fact that Azerbaijanis rarely adopted Russian names, outright, for their children at the beginning of the Soviet period raises the question of whether such a gesture would have overstepped Russian and/or Azerbaijani boundaries and norms. Nonetheless, Azerbaijanis gradually emulated and incorporated Russian naming patterns. Some selected names, especially for girls, derived from international stories that sounded like Russian three-syllable names such as Molière"s Elmira, Zemfira (from Pushkin"s Gypsies), Amalia, Ophelia, Aida, Tamilla, Tamara, and Esmira (from Esmeralda in Hugo"s Hunchback of Notre Dame).
Another way of russifying traditional Azerbaijani female names was to add "-a" as a final third syllable to the original name. For example, Narmin became Narmina and Gulnar became Gulnara. The final "-a" suffix was also added to feminize traditional Azerbaijani male names (e.g., Adil-Adila, Farid-Farida, Ilham-Ilhama, Natig-Natiga, and RamizRamiza.)
Azerbaijani male names were similarly russified. The most common practice during the 1940s and 1950s was to select a fairly short Azerbaijani name consisting of two syllables. Invariably, the first syllable contained an "a" or an "o," and the second syllable contained an "i" as in Rafig, Faig, Shaig, Namig, Natig, and Tofig. The final "g" in these names was often pronounced as the final "k" in traditional Russian-sounding names (e.g., Vladik from Vladislav, Slavik from Svyatoslav, and Stasik from Stanislav). Many such Azerbaijani names are actually of Arabic origin, but in some cases, when transmitted via Turkish, they were pronounced and spelled with a final "k" as in Russian (e.g., Rafik, Faik, Shaik, Namik, Natik, and Tofik). The transformation, therefore, occurred naturally and was easily accepted by both communities. This pattern of imitating Russian names by substituting a final "k" is still fairly prevalent.
De-russification of First Names
Despite its progress, a countercurrent opposed the russification process, and some people attempted to use names to express resistance.
While newly russified names were being adopted, "fresh" and "new-sounding" but decidedly Azerbaijani names appeared during the Soviet period. For example, at least 14 names were incorporated into the Azerbaijani naming system from the works of Jafar Jabbarli, Azerbaijan"s first major playwright of the Soviet period. These included male names such as Oqtay ("one who stays with his tribe or people"), Yashar ("existing" or "living"), Elkhan (denoting one of the earliest Turkic ranks), Aydin ("clear"), Qorkhmaz ("fearless"), Donmaz ("not shifting" or "turning from "The Way"") and Sonmaz ("eternally burning" or "eternally lit"). Female names derived from Jabbarli"s work include Almas ("diamond"), Solmaz ("unfading" or "always fresh"), Gyultakin ("like a flower"), Sevil ("beloved"), Gyular ("smiling" or "laughing"), Gyunduz ("daytime") and Gyulush ("laughter"). These Azerbaijani names continue to be very popular.
During the late 1940s and 1950s, the renowned national poet, Samad Vurgun created names for the Moon using the Turkic root "Ay" (pronounced as "eye"). These included Aygyun ("moon-sun") and Aybeniz ("moon-faced"). Vurgun named his own daughter Aybeniz and his granddaughter, Aygyun. With the establishment of these names within Azerbaijani society, people began to create new names with the stems "Ay" (moon) and "Gyun" (sun) such as Aynur ("moonlight"), Gyunay ("sun-moon"), and Ayten ("like the moon"). Azerbaijanis continue to build upon this stem and to introduce new names, such as Aytaj ("moon-crown"), Ayshan ("moon-happy") and Aysel ("moon-rushing waters"). These names are highly popular in contemporary Azerbaijani society.
Thus, the move to de-russify names occurred naturally toward the end of the Soviet period. Some people changed their names by removing Russian suffixes and either adding traditional suffixes or omitting the suffixes altogether. They found it very difficult to change their names during the perestroika period, when this movement began because of the negative reactions of most officials. However, such name changes gradually gained acceptance.
Azerbaijani Surnames
As mentioned above, many Azerbaijanis have removed "-(y)ev", "-(y)eva", "-ov", and "ova" from their surnames. Some have substituted traditional suffixes, such as "-zade" (of Persian origin, meaning "born of" as in Pashazade or Alizade) and "-li" / "-lu" (of Turkish origin, meaning "with" or "belonging to" as in Khanli or Koprulu), while others have omitted suffixes entirely. The choice of suffixes (none, Persian, or Turkish) constitutes one way for people to express their identities.
Name changes have also occurred in other ways. For example, in the name Narmina, the Russian-sounding final syllable "a" has been dropped, reverting the name to Narmin. An examination of 200 birth certificates issued in 1990-1996 revealed five occurrences of the name Narmin, while Narmina occurred only once. This is the opposite pattern to that found among 180 female names examined in the archival records for , wherein six records with Narmina and one with Narmin were found (Garibova & Blair, 1996) .
At the time of writing, de-russification of names has become a popular trend that is being encouraged by the government.
The Azerbaijani Terminology Commission has expressed concern regarding non-Azerbaijani sounding names. The deputy head of the Commission has even stated that Russian-sounding names like Maria Yekaterina, Olya, Alya, Sergey, Alexsandr, Dmitry, and Mikhail will be banned in the near future. She added that no Azerbaijani would want to marry someone with a Russian-sounding name. The rules would only apply to children who are ethnically Azeri. Foreigners living in Azerbaijan could still choose their children"s names freely.
The Azerbaijani Terminology Commission has further stated that long names composed of two or three names such as Najafguly (Najaf and Gulu), should be banned, and that people should instead choose short, names. Under presidential decree, the Commission has already submitted name changing proposals to the Azerbaijan government.
Although outright banning of these names may not be realized, there have also been proposals to replace Russian-sounding name endings in Azerbaijani surnames, such as "-ov," "-ova," "-(y)ev" and "-(y)eva," with "-az" and "-yaz." The reason for this is that "az" denotes the Azerbaijani Internet domain.
Similarly, several new proposals have been put forward; and the Committee"s proposals, which are being considered, will be accepted soon. While some Azerbaijani individuals and officials agree with the new proposal on names, others feel that any strict regulation will unfairly limit people"s freedom to choose names that are already in widespread use, or that have special meanings within families. (Note 4) Thus, while the issue of names has a bearing on nationalism, people should, as a human right, be entitled to choose names freely. Given the opposing factors at play, this problem will likely not be easily resolved.
International Self-Promotion: A Source of National Pride
Following Azerbaijan"s acquisition of oil and gas revenue, the country has enhanced its image through several grandiose construction projects, including buildings, towers, and pipelines, and other projects, including production of the largest national flag in the world. It has hosted various large-scale international events, and recruited top-ranking foreign athletes to promote sporting excellence. Considerable wealth, acquired from oil and natural gas resources, has made these projects possible.
Azerbaijan"s self-promotion has been very effective within the country as well as internationally. This is because such tangible achievements are widely recognized, contributing to a positive image of Azerbaijan. In turn, this fosters national pride and, by extension, Azerbaijani nationalism. While it is impossible to cover all of Azerbaijan"s remarkable achievements here, I will highlight some of the most impressive achievements below.
The Azerbaijani Flag
In 2011, Azerbaijan succeeded in developing the world"s largest national flag, which is 70 meters long and flies atop a 162-meter flagpole. It should be noted, however, that initial record-setting attempts failed because of strong winds. (Note 5) The record was broken within a short time, and the Azerbaijani flag is currently the second largest in the world. It is on display in the newly constructed Flag Park, from where residents have been forcibly relocated, and constitutes an important land mark for Azerbaijanis.
Baku"s Transformation
Baku"s development is another example of Azerbaijan"s attempts at self-promotion. Small buildings, houses, and roads have been demolished and several grand buildings, as well as fine, wide roads have been constructed in the city. Baku"s map, including that of the old city which has been renovated, has been transformed within a decade.
The three Flame Towers, Baku"s tallest skyscrapers at a height of 190 m (620 ft), have become landmarks in Azerbaijan. The buildings, comprising apartments, a hotel, and office blocks, have been built at an estimated cost of USD 350 million. Their construction began in 2007 and was completed in 2012. Dubai-based companies had a role in their design and construction. The towers aptly symbolize Azerbaijan, which means "land of fire." Their facades have been transformed into gigantic display screens deploying more than 10.000 high-power LED luminaires.
The Heydar Aliyev Center, also in Baku, is another important symbol of Azerbaijan. Heydar Aliyev, which is named after the Azerbaijani word for "charisma," is a building complex covering 619.000 square feet. Azerbaijan"s construction boom led to the development of many kinds of buildings designed for big events, such as great halls and stadiums. The Azerbaijan government continues to host large international events in Baku.
The Olympic Games
From the 2014 Olympics onward, Azerbaijan has repeatedly bid, although unsuccessfully, to host the summer or winter Olympic Games. The National Olympic Committee of Azerbaijan was created in 1992 and was recognized by the International Olympic Committee in 1993. Azerbaijan first participated at the Olympic Games as an independent nation in 1996 and has sent its athletes to compete at all subsequent Olympic. Games.
Azerbaijani athletes have performed particularly well in combat sports, winning a total of 26 medals at the Summer Olympic Games in wrestling, shooting, boxing, judo, and weightlifting. However, no medals have been won by Azerbaijanis during the Winter Olympic Games.
In addition to strongly influencing Azerbaijani nationalism, the Games have had political effects. For example, former President, Haydar Aliyev, appointed his son, Ilham Aliyev, as the president of the National Olympic Committee of Azerbaijan, despite the fact that holders of this post have normally been elected. He has retained the post since 1997 until the time of this writing, and he was re-elected in 2001 , and 2011 Ilham Aliyev was in fact disliked by Azerbaijanis during Heydar Aliyev"s lifetime. However his reputation improved after the 2000 Olympics, during which Azerbaijan won three medals, including two gold ones. (Note 9) As the president of the National Olympic Committee of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev attended all of the Olympic events. The Olympics have strongly influenced Azerbaijani nationalism, with attempts to host big games in Azerbaijan and receiving as many medals as possible being key aspects of this nationalism. It is important to stress here that, as previously mentioned, despite criticism of their authoritarian rule, the Aliyev family is highly respected in Azerbaijan.
At the time of writing, while Azerbaijan has not succeeded in hosting any Olympic Games it has hosted some other international sporting events, for example, in the fields of soccer and judo. The largest of these events was the European Games held in Baku in June 12-28, 2015. This was a significant event, regarded as a small-scale version of the Olympic Games. In addition, the inception of the European Games took place in Azerbaijan, which won the most medals after Russia. (Note 10) Moreover, it has been decided that the 2016 Formula 1 Grand Prix of Europe will be held in Baku the Baku City Circuit, the construction of which is set to be completed before June 2016.
To win more medals in such international games, Azerbaijan has recruited a number of foreign athletes, a common practice among nations, including Canada, Russia, and the US, has become widespread (Wilson & Lehren, 2008) . (Note 11) Some individuals, facing citizenship processing delays in their home countries, applied for fast-track Azerbaijani citizenship to enable them to represent the country at skating events during the 2010 Winter Olympic Games held in Vancouver, Canada. For example, Morgan Matthews followed in the footsteps of the American-born ice dancer, Kristin Fraser, who represented Azerbaijan during the 2006 Olympics without ever having visited the country.
At the 2012 Olympics, held in London, UK, where more than 50 athletes represented Azerbaijan, almost half were naturalized citizens originating from foreign countries. This highlighted a serious issue, which was further confirmed by an event in 2011, where two teenaged Bulgarian weightlifters, Boyanka Kostova and Valentin Hristov, switched their allegiance to Azerbaijan after Baku agreed to pay Bulgaria more than $500 000 to procure talented athletes. However, Bulgaria demanded an additional fee when it became clear that the duo would represent Azerbaijan at the 2012 Olympics, arguing that the original agreement did not permit this and threatening to block their participation. After months of squabbling, Bulgaria eventually relented and agreed to allow Kostova and Valentin to lift weights for Azerbaijan in London (Bigg, 2012; Kozlowska & Traywick, 2014) .
In addition, the inclusion of no less than six South Korean players in the women"s field hockey team representing Azerbaijan at the European Championship caused outrage (Slot, 2008) . Evidently, Azerbaijan has used large sums of money to attract top athletes to maximize wins in international games, and consequently to strengthen national pride.
The Eurovision Song Contest
The various new extravagant buildings in Azerbaijan include a grand music hall. Within the wider community of European nations participating in the annual Eurovision Song Contest, the nation to which the winner belongs hosts the Contest the following year. Azerbaijan made its debut at the Eurovision Song Contest in 2008, and its pop duo, Eldar and Nigar (also known as Ell and Nikki) won the contest in 2011. This brought great honor to the Azerbaijanis and to Azerbaijan, which gained the right to host the Eurovision Song Contest in 2012. In preparation for hosting the 2012 Contest, Azerbaijan constructed a magnificent hall and related buildings; this involved extensive forced migrations in the construction zone. It is not widely known that many protest movements were initiated to oppose the construction.
Moreover, substantial corruption relating to the construction was uncovered. In May 2012, a joint investigation was launched by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. A leading Azerbaijani journalist, Khadija Ismayilova, discovered that the Aliyev family had personally profited from the construction of the Crystal Hall, the new concert showplace built to host the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest at a cost of USD 134 million. (Note 12) Thus, while being a potent symbol of Azerbaijani national pride and nationalism, it also brought considerable disgrace to Azerbaijanis. 
Oil and Gas Pipelines and Communication Networks
Azerbaijan is making good use of its resource wealth to position itself as a regional hub for oil and natural gas as well as rail and road networks linking Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey with Europe. In 2006, the well-known Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline began operations, serving as the main pipeline for exporting Azerbaijani gas. Moreover, it is also a political pipeline. Within Azerbaijan, the BTC pipeline is known as the "Heydar Aliyev" pipeline in honor of the national hero. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas pipeline has also been constructed, running alongside this pipeline. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey are now working to develop a rail and road network connecting Baku with Tbilisi and Kars. After the collapse of the plan to develop the Nabucco pipeline as the new southern pipeline extending from Azerbaijan to Europe, detouring Ukraine, it was decided that three relatively small and connected pipelines would be constructed instead. These are: the Nabucco-West pipeline, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, and the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline. While both Azerbaijan and Turkey are responsible for the latter, this can be considered an Azerbaijani project, because the operator is the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) which holds a 58% share in this project. (Note 13) Such international infrastructure is also fostering Azerbaijani national pride and has raised Azerbaijan"s status globally.
2.2.6 The Role of the Azerbaijani Diaspora in Promoting Nationalism: Focusing on the Khojaly Tragedy
The impact of the NKC on Azerbaijani nationalism seems to be waning every year, with more than two decades having passed since the declaration of a ceasefire. However, as a key symbolic reminder of the NKC, the Khojaly tragedy continues to fuel Azerbaijani nationalism.
The Khojaly tragedy, also known as the Khojaly Massacre, refers to a serious incident that occurred during the NKC on February 25-26, 1992. According to the Azerbaijani government, as well as Memorial Human Rights Center, Human Rights Watch, and other international observers, the massacre was committed by ethnic Armenian armed forces, reportedly with the help of the Russian 366 th Motor Rifle Regiment, which did not apparently act on orders from the command. The death toll claimed by Azerbaijani authorities was 613 civilians, including 106 women and 63 children. This incident was the worst and largest massacre that occurred during the conflict and became symbolic of the NKC, further fueling Azerbaijanis" feelings of enmity toward the Armenians. The conflict has inspired numerous mourning ceremonies and events, worldwide.
Within Azerbaijan, many such ceremonies and events are held, and TV programs about the conflict are broadcasted every year. In recent years, the Azerbaijani diaspora has organized such events worldwide, especially in the US.
The term "diaspora" initially referred to the dispersal of the Jews outside of Palestine after Babylon"s capture. However, it now refers more broadly to any group dispersed, for whatever reason, outside of its traditional homeland.
The Azerbaijani diaspora is not insignificant in size and its influence is growing. It comprises Azerbaijani communities living outside of Azerbaijan or within the Iranian portion of Azerbaijan. Its numbers and distribution are shown in Table 1 Examples of such activities include actions to promote memorials relating to the Khojaly tragedy. This paper focuses on movements in Washington, DC, and New York, where memorials have been organized annually since 2010 with the cooperation of the Azerbaijani government and Azerbaijani diasporic organizations. Their aim is not only to sustain the memory of the Khojaly tragedy, but also to foster wider recognition of this event abroad, especially in influential global centers such as Washington, DC, and New York.
The Azerbaijani-American Alliance (AAA), which was founded as a non-partisan and non-profit organization, and has been active in the US, conducts large-scale campaigns focusing on the Khojaly tragedy.
According to the AAA, as part of this campaign, hundreds of ads bearing the slogan "Khojaly: A Human Tragedy Against Azerbaijan" (see Figure 2) were posted on portable and stationary information boards at metro stations, bus stops, and on the exteriors of buses and trains. They were even posted in conspicuous areas in the two cities such as the large board in New York"s Times Square. These informative signs, posted on the sides of buildings, are illuminated by the lights of passing cars. At some locations, several video posters rotating at 180 degrees have also been installed. In addition to public awareness efforts, the Khojaly campaign has included lobbying efforts aimed at convincing legislative bodies at various levels to formally recognize the massacre. In 2013, a petition seeking formal recognition of the tragedy was submitted to the White House. Thus far, state legislatures in Arkansas and New Mexico have adopted resolutions commemorating Khojaly. Since 2010, legislatures in Massachusetts, Texas, New Jersey, Maine, and Georgia have also recognized Khojaly, with another "two to three" states working on this, according to Adil Baguirov, the co-founder and managing director of the US Azeris Network (Baguirov, 2013) . In addition, national parliaments in Mexico, Colombia, Pakistan, and the Czech Republic have formally recognized the Massacre.
However, the campaign has not always proceeded smoothly. For example, a petition calling on the White House to "issue a proclamation commemorating and recognizing the war crime of the Khojaly massacre, and its victims" (Kucera, 2013) received more than 125 000 signatures in 2013. It was the second most popular petition in the short history of the White House's public petition program, under which the presidential administration will respond to any petition with more than 100 000 signatures. However the official White House response was tepid: "While we will not be issuing a Presidential Proclamation, the United States deeply regrets the tragic losses of life in the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia" (Kucera, 2013) . Although very disappointed, Azerbaijanis have affirmed that they will continue their activities with enthusiasm. (Note 16) 
The Regional and International Contexts
Has Nationalism Influenced the Iranian Azerbaijanis?
The Aras River divides the Azerbaijanis into those living in Azerbaijan and those in Iranian territory. It is not known exactly how many Azerbaijanis live in Iran. However, this population is estimated to be more than double that that of the Azerbaijan Republic. The reason for the division of Azerbaijanis within two states originates from the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828), wherein Iran was forced to cede its dependent khanates located north of the Aras River to Russia. Consequently, Azerbaijanis refer to the Azerbaijan Republic as "North Azerbaijan" and to northern parts of Iran inhabited by Azerbaijani as "South Azerbaijan." Although both groups speak Azeri and share the same culture, their intonations differ slightly and their perceptions and ways of thinking are also different. However, many Northern Azerbaijanis tend not to differentiate between Azerbaijanis living in the Republic and in Iranian Azerbaijan, regarding the latter as "kith and kin and not small people have family [on] the other side of the River Aras (Atabaki, 2000; Fawcett, 2009; Heradstveit, 2009 ).
Within the multiethnic Iranian state, the Azerbaijanis constitute the largest minority group, variously estimated to comprise between a fifth and a third of the total population. Many Azerbaijanis also have highly influential positions within Iran, especially in business, social and religious circles. For example, Ali Hosseini Khamenei, the second and current Supreme Leader of Iran and a Muslim cleric, is ethnically Azerbaijani. Furthermore, the warm climate and fertile land of northern Iran, where the Azerbaijani reside, are well suited to agriculture. Consequently, Iran highly values this area and its people and aims to retain them.
While Azerbaijanis, especially the nationalists and intelligentsia, in the Azerbaijan Republic have long attempted to recover "South Azerbaijan," there has been no large-scale movement for integration except for a very short time during perestroika. However, most of the Iranian Azerbaijani have never wanted integration with the Azerbaijan Republic. When I interviewed them, they provided the following reasons. (Note 18) They accord the highest value to stability and Iran provides them with such stability, enabling them to live without any shortages relating to jobs, foods, and money. Conversely, the Azerbaijan Republic is in conflict with Armenia and has been confused by issues relating to Russia. However,, the Azerbaijani language is not officially used in Iran, including in schools, and alcohol consumption is banned. These are causes of dissatisfaction among Iranian Azerbaijanis. (Note 19) The Iranian Azerbaijanis, like many people in the former USSR, seem to be yearning for stability more than freedom. In addition, the rights of Iranian Azerbaijanis seem to be improving. For example, in 1997, the policies of President Muhammad Khatami, then newly elected, widened the scope of cultural rights for minorities to win the support of the periphery.
However, Iran has been overly apprehensive about movements to integrate Azerbaijanis across Azerbaijan and Iran, although such movements may not occur in the near future and most Iranian Azerbaijanis want to maintain the status quo. Iranian authorities also fear that the Azerbaijan Republic, as a large, rich, successful, and attractive country, will be very appealing to Iranian Azerbaijanis who may desire integration with Azerbaijan. Therefore, Iran has a negative attitude toward Azerbaijan and is trying to undermine the Azerbaijan Republic. This is reflected in Iran"s support for Armenia, a Christian state, during the NKC and its attempts to obstruct Azerbaijan"s oil and gas projects, despite the fact that both Azerbaijan and Iran are Islamic (Shi"ite) states. (Note 20)
Currently, however, Azerbaijan is acknowledged as an economically successful state because of its oil and natural gas wealth, and Azerbaijani nationalism is growing.
Recent Activities and Movements of Iranian Azerbaijanis
While there were only a few movements focusing on the integration of the Azerbaijanis at the end of the perestroika period, pan-Azerbaijani movements have emerged over the last decade. Nationalism is often triggered by tragedies, including war, conflict, political turmoil, and natural disasters. Although Azerbaijani nationalism has always existed in northwestern Iran, it has greatly increased from the 1990s onward. This can be attributed to a combination of several different factors affecting the Azerbaijani minority. Here, I identify the most important factors that have influenced Iran"s Azerbaijanis.
An immanent American attack on Iran in the spring of 2006 prompted a revival of the flagging idea of a pan-Azeri identity. Indeed, Azerbaijan feared that a military attack on Iran could destabilize the country to such a degree that oppressed minorities could seek new alliances with surrounding states and ethnic groups.
Subsequently, riots broke out in May and June of 2006. On May 12, 2006, the Iranian state newspaper, Iran, printed a grossly insulting caricature of an Azerbaijani as a stupid, dirty cockroach with an article directed against the Azerbaijani minority. Following this publication, thousands of demonstrators amassed in cities of Iran that were mostly populated by Azerbaijanis, as well as in Tehran, where demonstrations were initiated by students. The protestors even seized a television transmitter for a short period in the western city of Urmia, as well as a municipal building in the eastern city of Sulduz. The vast majority of local police and militia groups, composed of ethnic Azerbaijanis, refused to take action against their compatriots. The demonstrators called for punishment of those responsible for the caricature and the article; a demand that was finally met. The authors of the article and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper were dismissed, and publication of the newspaper was temporarily suspended. However, the demonstrations continued. Protestors shouted political slogans such as: "I am proud to be a Turk!" "Down with Persian chauvinism!" "Keep your hands off of Azerbaijan!" and "We want instruction in Turkish in our schools!" Militia and army units were called in from other areas in Iran to end the demonstrations, resulting in dozens of deaths. According to some reports, mainly provided by Azerbaijani nationalists, there were more than 100 victims. The exact number of victims is not, however, known because of Teheran"s strict information embargo concerning the events in northwestern Iran (Alikhan, 2008, p. 98) . Thus, if a conflict or a domestic crisis were to occur, it would likely fuel Azeri ethno-nationalism.
Further, a sizeable number of young Iranians are dissatisfied with the restrictive regime of the clerics, and this dissatisfaction was exacerbated during the bloody unrest surrounding the reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009. At that time, feelings against the Iranian authorities had some impact on assertions of Azerbaijani nationalism and other (Moosavi, 2007) .
Technical developments too have helped to strengthen self-identification among Iranian Azerbaijanis. For many years, Iranian Azerbaijanis could only watch the news on Azerbaijani television channels, and that too, for just 30 minutes in a week. However, by accessing satellite broadcasts, they are not only able to watch Azerbaijani channels now, but also Turkish and western channels (Souleimanov, Pikal, & Kraus, 2013) . Such programs have enhanced feelings of being "Azerbaijani" or "Turkish" among Iranian Azerbaijanis.
Commencing from 2000, the Lake Urmia controversy has led to infusion of the environmental movement with Azerbaijani nationalism. Located on the border between the Iranian provinces of Western and Eastern Azerbaijan, Lake Urmia is a unique natural site and is listed as a UNESCO biosphere reservation. However, this salt lake faces severe environmental threats attributed to its lack of outflow and agricultural intensification in surrounding areas. Moreover, increasing use of water from rivers that feed the lake and the construction of over 30 dams in these streams have led to steady shrinkage of the lake"s surface area. According to some experts, the lake could dry up completely within just a few years. However, the Iranian government has not taken any serious measures to address this issue. Iranian Azerbaijanis, for whom the lake is symbolic of Southern Azerbaijan, feel strongly about this and have launched a series of protests, hoping to draw attention to this serious ecological problem. The Iranian authorities took a very hard line against the demonstrators, as they always do. Consequently, the demonstrators reacted by raising political and nationalistic issues during the protests.
Despite the government"s negative reaction, further demonstrations occurred in mid-2011, during which slogans such as: "Lake Urmia is drying up; Iran has ordered its execution," and "Urmia is thirsty. Azerbaijan must take a stand or lose the lake" were common (Souleimanov, Pikal, & Kraus, 2013) .
Thus, while the Iranian Azerbaijani undertook several nationalistic actions or demonstrations, the Iranian government"s consistently negative attitude and harsh responses repeatedly reinforced Azerbaijani nationalism, resulting in a vicious cycle.
From the early 2000s, in spite of restrictions imposed by the Iranian authorities, Azerbaijanis have held regular mass marches to their nationally symbolic sites: Mount Savalan and the Bazz Fortress. Separatist slogans, pan-Turkic symbolism, and displays of the banned flag of South Azerbaijan (which is similar to that of the Republic of Azerbaijan) are widely deployed during these marches. In addition to the marches, clashes between ethnically Azerbaijani and Persian soccer fans are becoming increasingly frequent. Moreover, anonymous posters calling for instruction in Turkish, along with flags of Azerbaijan and Turkey, have begun to appear in Tabriz, Urmia, Maraz, Sulduz, Ardabil, and several other towns in Iranian Azerbaijan. The posters are put up overnight in prominent places and are immediately torn down by police and militia units.
In addition, some explosions occurred at the police station in northern Iran in 2009, for which Azerbaijani nationalists were thought to be responsible. Azerbaijani nationalistic movements have been limited up to now in Iran. However, authorities in both Azerbaijan and Iran fear that the movements could connect nationalists residing in Azerbaijan and Iran and, therefore, expand.
Keeping the Balance: The Role of Diplomacy
In recent years, there have been dramatic changes in the global situation, notable examples being the Ukrainian and Syria crises. These developments have created a difficult situation in and around Russia, which is a very important neighbor to Azerbaijan. In addition, China"s global influence has radically increased, as evidenced by its efforts to realize its goal of "One Belt, One Road" and its leading role in founding the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
However, Azerbaijan does not seem to have been significantly affected by these radical changes in the international environment. From the time of Heydar Aliyev"s presidency and the establishment of the "Aliyev regime," Azerbaijan has maintained a good balance, diplomatically, between Russia and the West (the US and Europe). The Azerbaijanis strongly support this diplomatic policy because of the difficulties they experienced during the time of the Elchbei regime, which, as previously mentioned, invited reprisals from Russia because of its strongly pro-West and pro-Turkey stance.
Georgia, Azerbaijan"s neighbor, has adopted an anti-Russian and pro-Western policy, inviting many kinds of retaliatory actions by Russia such as economic sanctions, the August War in 2008, and recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are not recognized by Georgia. Azerbaijan"s careful efforts to maintain a balance between Russia and the West seem to have been successful. (Note 21) Despite its close relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan was able to maintain a status quo with both Turkey and Russia after their relationship was seriously undermined by an incident entailing the shooting down of a Russian military airplane by Turkey in November 2015. Consequently, Russia has not taken a strong stance against Azerbaijan in recent years and the relation between them is stable.
Moreover, Azerbaijan has not been affected by the situation relating to Iran, for example, the lifting of sanctions against Iran by the West especially by the US. Despite being close neighbors, the two countries have a strained relation.
A final point is that Azerbaijan has not been affected by recent Chinese activities. China, which has been extending its influence in Eurasia, including the former USSR, through its "One Belt, One Road" policy, maintains that it has already established strong ties with Azerbaijan. This is evidenced, according to China"s leaders and media, by goods that Chinese have transported via rail, although in fact they not only used the rail transportation to Turkmenistan, but also transportation by vessel across the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan. In addition, Azerbaijan has joined the AIIB, which is mainly led by China. Azerbaijan"s neighbor, Georgia, has been strongly influenced by China, with many Chinese companies operating in Georgia. However, Azerbaijani officials, journalists, and academicians deny China"s claims of an association with Azerbaijan, claiming that Azerbaijan is still free from Chinese influence and that there has not yet been any significant movement of Chinese companies into Azerbaijan (Note 22).
Thus, Azerbaijan has been successful in maintaining a balanced policy and self-reliance. Moreover, a factor that seems to have fueled Azerbaijani nationalism is such strong attitudes on the part of other sovereign states.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to elucidate the complex situation of Azerbaijani nationalism. Despite its brief history, Azerbaijani nationalism has been complicated, entailing a shift in its characteristics over a short duration commencing from its second independence after 1991.
Azerbaijani nationalism has been influenced by many factors, including religion, history, culture and relations with Iranian Azerbaijanis. While the NKC and relations with Russia prompted nationalism among the Azerbaijanis, its characteristics changed, over time, after the NKC ceasefire.
Movements around nationalism, in addition to domestic practices such as name changes, have been important factors behind recent trends in Azerbaijani nationalism. Efforts to appeal to the international community through various constructions and good performances at international competitions, and by hosting large-scale events, have had significant effects on Azerbaijanis as well as on the international community. In addition, the activities of the Azerbaijani diaspora, supported by the Azerbaijan government, are also attracting attention. Movements relating to Azerbaijan nationalism further resonate with those of Iranian Azerbaijanis. Especially in recent years, Azerbaijani nationalism within Iran has been growing, prompted by the situation of the Azerbaijan Republic, political and economic dissatisfaction with the Iranian government, and free access to global information. In addition, the Aliyev regime has succeeded in maintaining balanced diplomacy not only between Russia and the West, but also between Russia and China, along with a policy of self-reliance.
Thus, while Azerbaijani nationalism has been considered an outcome of the NKC, it has subsequently been transformed and is now multilayered and complex. Thus, whereas Azerbaijani nationalism has been attributed solely to anti-Armenian and anti-Russian sentiments, national pride which has been fueled by domestic and international factors, is currently playing an important role in its creation and maintenance.
However, recent expressions of Azerbaijani nationalism have been extravagant and are sustained by Azerbaijan"s economic prosperity, based on its oil and gas wealth. The present base of nationalism is thus weak and fragile, and Azerbaijan should, consequently, change its underlying attitude relating to its nationalism policy. The Azerbaijani government should diversify its economy and growth, maintaining Azerbaijani nationalism, domestically and internationally, at a much lower cost.
